

PEACE, A CONTESTED IDENTITY: JAPAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION AND GRASSROOTS PEACE MOVEMENTS

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This article provides an ethnographic account of peace in contemporary Japanese society, focusing on the ongoing political agenda—the revision of Japan's Constitution. For the Japanese people, pacifism is a culturally embedded concept that has defined their social and political lives during the post-World War II era. It has shaped Japanese individual and group identities, social relations, and practices. This article explores the ways in which peace represents a set of contested identities constructed through politics at the state level as well as through everyday life at the individual level. Peace is not a fixed concept nor can it be defined only by the state or authorities. The dynamic process of identity construction is examined through distinct narratives generated by both pro-revisionists and grassroots anti-revisionists on the Constitution.

INTRODUCTION¹

The Constitution of Japan

Preface (excerpt)

We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

Chapter II. Renunciation of War

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

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(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The above phrases are from the Preface and Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which adopted pacifism as one of its principles. The Constitution has been in effect without any amendment since May 3, 1947, making it one of the oldest single-document national constitutions in the world.

Defined in the Preface and Article 9, Japan's pacifism consists of three elements: (1) the right to live in peace; (2) renunciation of all forms of war as a means of settling international disputes; and (3) abolition of armed forces. Constitutional scholars point out that Japan's pacifism can originally be attributed to the "perpetual peace" advocated by Immanuel Kant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, an international treaty that provided for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.² Further, pacifist thoughts, which were argued by prewar Japanese scholars and activists such as Nakae Chomin, Uchimura Kanzo, Tanaka Shozo, and Ishibashi Tanzan, formed the historical background of the constitution for peace. Meanwhile, Higuchi Yoichi claims that Japan's pacifism attempts to extend beyond Western concepts of pacifism.³ This is indeed consistent with the desire for peace found in Western political thought since ancient Greece and with the history of positive law since the Constitution of France in 1794, which renounced wars of aggression. However, Japan's pacifism rejects the concept that a state can resort to war for a justifiable aim. Instead, the Preface and Article 9 elucidate the lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: There are no "just" wars. Higuchi argues, "This is the broader significance of Japan's Constitutionalism—the attempt through acceptance of Western constitutionalism to transcend it."⁴

For the Japanese people, pacifism is a culturally embedded norm that has defined their social and political lives during the post-World War II era. It has shaped Japanese individual and group identities, social relations, and practices. Meanwhile, it provides a sense of security in the Northeast Asian region, including China and Korea, where bitter memories of Japan's wartime aggression still linger.⁵ Sixty years later, however, conservative politicians—major players in Japanese politics—believe that there are provisions within the Constitution, such as Article 9, that no longer fit the reality of international

relations following the end of the Cold War. In May 2007, Japan's parliament under prime minister and ardent nationalist Abe Shinzō passed a bill to set national referendum procedures for constitutional amendments as early as 2010, establishing its first legal framework to rewrite the pacifist Constitution.⁶ The passage at the Diet formally initiated a step toward boosting national debates. In particular, the discussion regarding the constitutional amendment is expected to focus on the revision of Article 9.

This paper provides an ethnographic account of peace in contemporary Japanese society, with a particular focus on this ongoing political agenda—the revision of Japan's Constitution. The focus is to understand how Japanese policymakers and grassroots individuals produce (and reproduce) their narratives on peace amid the revision process. How is peace talked about? Peace is not a fixed concept nor can it be defined only by the state or authorities.⁷ Peace represents a set of contested identities constructed (and reconstructed) not only through politics at the state level but also through everyday life at the individual level. Identity is a particular configuration of ideas and practices about both the self and group definition. It exists and is acquired, claimed, and allocated within power relations over daily struggles. This article examines the ways in which such expressions of identity can be deployed in a collective means as a political strategy. Different value structures and preferences produce different identities, expressing respective worldviews in terms of very distinct narratives. The narratives can certainly change according to the context, and a post-Cold War context seems to play a divisive role in shaping narratives on Japanese pacifism. There are fundamental conflicts in the political environment surrounding the discourse on Japan's pacifism, primarily expressed by Article 9, between conservative policymakers and ordinary individuals in anti-revision movements at the grassroots level. The former are producing policy narratives in favor of disembedding the postwar pacifist norm to build a new state identity for Japan in the international community—one whereby it expands its role in peacekeeping operations, responding to the reality of political life in the post-Cold War era. They are acknowledging the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as a full-fledged military entity; they are using the constitutional revision as a justification for their conservative political beliefs. Meanwhile, the conflicts and disagreements involved in constructing such an identity are resented by the individuals at the grassroots levels who are trying to re-embed the postwar norm. Alter-

native narratives generated through dynamic social movements against the revision are spreading across the country. In an attempt to protect the principle that there are no “just” wars—a distinctive characteristic of Japan’s pacifism—these nationwide social movements are molded by spontaneous, independent, and free organized groups and circles at community levels or at workplaces. Taking over the rich tradition of peace movements in postwar Japan, the participants are recalling their war experiences and memories of World War II. This essay primarily documents how they develop a collective identity by sharing their narratives in an attempt to challenge the dominant conservative discourse in Japanese politics.

PEACE: THE CORE OF JAPANESE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Looking at the history of the post-World War II era, Japan has a rich tradition of social movements. The pursuit of peace is centered around the ideology of Article 9. The major peace movements were already active in the early postwar era, and they included three entities: the anti-nuclear movement since the mid-1950s; the struggle against the US-Japan Security Treaty (*Anpo*) around 1960; and *Beheiren* (Peace for Vietnam! Citizens’ Committee), the transnational anti-Vietnam War efforts in Japan in the 1960s. Peace is a core value of Japanese social movements, and the current movement against constitutional revision led by the Article 9 Association (*9-jō no kai*) can be traced back to the postwar peace movements. Amalgamating the aspects of the old and new social movements,⁸ the Japanese peace movements have been accumulating knowledge on mobilization strategies; the peace movements provide a solid foundation on how to mobilize masses for a social movement.

Shortly after the war, in the 1950s, the Japanese people began publicly advocating for peace; this was originally triggered by the ban on the use of atomic bombs in the wake of the Lucky Dragon incident of 1954. A Japanese tuna fishing boat, Lucky Dragon 5 (*Daigo Fukuryū Maru*), was exposed to nuclear fallout by a U.S. hydrogen bomb test on Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific, and one of the crew members succumbed to acute radiation syndrome. Public sentiment against nuclear weapons manifested into a social movement, which was controlled by the political left. Initiated by Yasui Kaoru, a law professor, the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (*Gensuikyō*) was established in August 1955 in Hiroshima for advo-

cating against the development of nuclear materials. Later in the 1960s, because of ideological differences, the group split into two factions: *Gensuikyō* was supported by the Japan Communist Party (JCP), while the Japan Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (*Gensuikin*) was supported by activists affiliated with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and moderate leftist trade unions.⁹ During the Cold War era, these groups were exceptionally active in condemning warfare, particularly nuclear warfare and preparations. In fact, they advocated international cooperation and an enhanced role for the United Nations.

The subsequent event was the struggle against the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in the 1960s, popularly known as *Anpo*, a milestone in postwar Japanese politics. Following the intensification of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–1953), Japan was gradually incorporated into the US security strategy as a bastion against communism in the Far East. While the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) revised the implemented liberal policy very early in the postwar period, in 1950, General MacArthur instructed Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to establish the National Police Reserve—reorganized in 1954 as SDF—as the first step toward the rearmament of Japan. The Japanese government signed the Security Treaty with the United States in 1951. This treaty, when renewed in 1960, permitted US forces to be stationed in Japan.¹⁰ At that moment, millions took to the streets for months in protest against the Japanese government's renewal of the treaty and its forcible ratification. Finally, growing public furor forced Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke to step down. As John Dower documents, “As elsewhere, ‘people’s power’ entered the Japanese lexicon at this time as a legitimate and essential alternative to bourgeois parliamentary politics; and, as elsewhere, the theory and practice of ‘people’s power’ ranged from peaceful protest to wanton violence.”¹¹

Such grassroots dynamism was then organized under the anti-Vietnam War movement in the 1960s. One of the key groups was *Beheiren* or Peace for Vietnam! Citizens’ Committee, led by Oda Makoto, a writer and social activist. The *Beheiren* group created loose, decentralized networks with diverse stakeholders, including businessmen, housewives, teachers, students, and the unemployed, allowing them to explore the meaning of life through their participation in the movement.¹² Such a spontaneous, contentious body came to be featured as a key actor in Japan’s postwar social and political life. As Volker Fuhr points out, the *Beheiren* group brought new

strategies to Japanese peace movements.¹³ First, *Beheiren* chose decentralized structures that were open to anyone, adopting the principle of participatory democracy that is characteristic of the United States. In fact, there was no top-bottom relationship between the national representative body and its local groups. Second, led by politically left-wing intellectuals, the group explicitly defined itself as fighting for a single cause and with one realistic aim: the end of the Vietnam War. *Beheiren* promised to dissolve once peace in Vietnam was achieved, and it did so in 1974. Third, *Beheiren* introduced several forms of action that were hitherto largely unknown in Japan, such as demonstrations and protest advertisements in newspapers. Fourth, it established nonviolent action as a principle of social movements.

Although the peace movement itself gradually became moribund, these movements' strategies were actively employed as environmental movements and consumers' movements against increasing pollution as a result of economic development in the 1970s and thereafter.¹⁴ The strategies came from the Japanese people's attempts at flexibly incorporating their value of peace taken from the first element of Japanese pacifism—the right to live in peace—in the Constitution's Preface. The movements were in fact a manifestation of the people widely seeking peace in their daily lives. The memory and experience of grassroots mobilization have recently been revived in the movement against constitutional revision in the 2000s, which is discussed in a later section of this article.

EXPLORING A NEW STATE IDENTITY

In the early 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, pacifist sentiment gradually but steadily reversed because of the change in the course of international politics.¹⁵ This change meant that the Japanese people began advocating Japan's role and, in popular terms, making contributions (*kōken-suru*) to international society. This was a process of exploring new social and political identities. Politicians, political parties, and business lobbies, all of which belong to the conservative camp, played a significant role in redefining the Japanese discourse of peace and security after the Cold War, trying to establish a new state identity in the international community.

One of the first incidents to result in changes in the post-Cold War discourse was during the buildup to the Gulf War in August 1990. The Japanese government paid approximately \$1.3 billion to

the Coalition Forces as a way of making a contribution, responding to the strong demand from the United States. Further, the government dispatched SDF minesweepers to the Gulf area. In 1992, the Act for Collaboration with Peace-Keeping Operations of the United Nations (UN) passed the Diet, making it possible for the Japanese SDF to go abroad for peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance; later that year, the SDF was dispatched to Cambodia (1992–1993) to assist the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) with peacekeeping operations. Since then, Japan has continued to uphold a law allowing the deployment of troops to cooperate in such activities as peacekeeping, reconstruction support, and replenishment, in Mozambique (1993–1995), Rwanda (1994), Golan Heights (1996–present), East Timor (1999–2000, 2002–2004), Indian Ocean (2001–November 2007, restarted in early 2008 to January 2010), Iraq (2004–2008),¹⁶ Nepal (2007–January 2011), Sudan (2008–present), and Haiti (2010–present).

In the 1990s, the US-Japan Security Treaty changed in character. The Tokyo Declaration in 1992 emphasized global partnership between the two countries. A symbolic incident in Japanese politics was the 1994 review of the SDF by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, the first prime minister from the JSP after the occupational period. To form the first coalition cabinet with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Murayama abandoned his party's major security platform, which had rejected the SDF and the US-Japan Security Treaty. Over the decades, in fact, the SDF called for a debate between the left wing and the conservatives on the macro discourse in Japanese politics. The former claimed that the SDF was unconstitutional; any attempt at dispatching the SDF abroad was prohibited by the Diet resolution of 1954. On the other hand, the latter claimed that the Japanese state should follow a pragmatic interpretation of Article 9, with the government articulating that “[s]ince the right of self-defense is not denied, the Government interprets this to mean that the Constitution allows Japan to possess the minimum level of armed force needed to exercise that right. Therefore, the Government, as part of its exclusively national defense oriented policy under the Constitution, maintains the SDF as an armed organization, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations.”¹⁷ In 1996, both governments reconsidered the implications of the US-Japan Security Treaty; they emphasized the outbreak of various regional conflicts after the end of the Cold War and agreed that it was necessary to jointly prevent and deal with such conflicts. Japan was supposed to cooperate with US troops within its

administrative territory as well as the entire Asia-Pacific region, although this sparked strong protest movements against the military base in Okinawa, where a majority (three-fourths) of the US troops in Japan had been stationed.

These changes in political attitude in the post-Cold War era distinctively contributed to the recent surge in arguments pertaining to the constitutional revision in Japanese society, seeking a new identity for Japan in the international community. In January 2000, the Japanese government officially embarked on a study of the Constitution. The Diet set up the Research Commission to study the Constitution from broad and comprehensive perspectives over a five-year period until 2005. Article 9, which conveys Japan's pacifism and the renunciation of war, was one of the most intensely discussed topics. The Commission in the House of Representatives discussed the Constitution and produced a 710-page final report in April 2005, emphasizing the need for amending Article 9.¹⁸ The report states that according to a majority opinion—formed by members of the ruling LDP and its coalition partner New Komeito, along with the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)—the Japanese state should maintain the pacifism policy and retain Clause 1 of Article 9 (renouncing war). Regarding Clause 2 of Article 9, on the other hand, the report stated that a majority did not deny taking some form of constitutional means based on the right to self-defense and the SDF. The majority opinion also stated that the nation should be authorized to use a minimum level of force for self-defense. Nakayama Taro, an LDP politician and chair of the Commission commented, “[T]here is pivotal change in the national security sphere surrounding our country. Under these circumstances, the concept of security has significantly changed from national to regional and human security, forcing Japan to adopt various measures in both security and international cooperation.”¹⁹

Meanwhile, political parties created their own draft proposals for constitutional amendment.²⁰ The LDP's draft, which was announced in November 2005 as part of the LDP's fiftieth anniversary celebrations, placed the nation on a path of reform to encounter the challenges of a rapidly changing world; it primarily featured the removal of Clause 2 of Article 9, to allow Japan to officially possess in name what it already had in the form of the SDF—a full-fledged, active military. To elaborate, the SDF was defined as a military force that was responsible for defending Japan and partaking in international peacekeeping efforts. Currently, Article 9 stipulates that Japan

will never maintain land, sea, and air forces or any other war forces. Linking Japan's current state of change to the dramatic transformations that occurred during the Meiji Restoration and shortly after World War II, Koizumi Junichiro, prime minister of Japan at the time, stated, "Both the Meiji reforms and postwar reforms were carried out at the sacrifice of the people. ... Commemorating the (LDP's) fiftieth anniversary, our responsibility as the ruling party lies in the reforms we carry out in peace time to deal with changes in the world."²¹ The same article also reported that Mori Yoshiro, former prime minister and chair of the LDP's constitution drafting committee, welcomed the draft, stating that the party must humbly work with other parties and gain public support for the revision. Mori stated, "The current Constitution is said to be drafted (by the Occupation) in nine days, but it took the LDP fifty years to come up with its own, calling the planned new charter the starting point and the reason for the LDP's formation. It's the twenty-first century. The time is ripe for the Japanese to choose a Constitution of their own."²² He also commented that "instituting our own constitution has been the theme of our party since its foundation. The momentum for revision has risen in both the ruling and opposition camps in the Diet and public interest has spread to an unprecedented extent. ... We should not miss this chance."²³ Meanwhile, mass media—newspapers such as *Yomiuri Shinbun* in 1994 and *Asahi Shinbun* in 1995 and a liberal monthly magazine *Sekai* in 1993–4—volunteered to formulate their own proposals on the revision.²⁴ The *Yomiuri* proposed to revise Article 9, while the *Asahi* and *Sekai* strongly supported Article 9.

Further, important politicians and major business organizations supported the amendment. Nakasone Yasuhiro, prime minister in the 1980s, was well known as a longtime advocate of the revision of the Constitution. He released his own draft that formally proposed declaring the emperor as the head of state, granting greater powers to the prime minister, and enabling Japan to use its military power when necessary.²⁵ The draft, which was originally written in 1961, was published in *Seiron*, a conservative monthly magazine, in July 1997, for the first time. Meanwhile, Ozawa Ichiro, the former leader of the DPJ, supported the revision, although the party still could not produce a comprehensive proposal draft as their official standpoint. When he was a key member of the LDP in the early 1990s, however, Ozawa advocated calling for the government to change the interpretation of the war-renouncing Constitution and practically approve the SDF's

collaboration with UN forces as a “normal nation.”²⁶ In addition, the Japan Business Federation (*Nippon keidanren*) released a series of proposals for constitutional amendments; these proposals would allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense and recognize the existing SDF as a military force.²⁷ The Junior Chamber International Japan (*Nippon seinen kaigisho*)—popularly known as JC—also produced a proposal in accordance with the Japan Business Federation.²⁸

The pacifists have indeed been marginalized in post-Cold War politics. Richard Samuels points out three factors pertaining to their marginalization: The first is the changing security environment in Northeast Asia.²⁹ The issue concerns the right of collective defense, considering Japan’s relationship with North Korea. The Japanese government is trying to change the current constitutional interpretation barring the country from exercising the right of collective self-defense. It has believed that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense goes beyond the limit of self-defense authorized in Article 9 of the Constitution.³⁰ However, under international law, there is recognition that a state has the right of collective self-defense: A state has the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which the state has close relations, even if the state itself is not under direct attack.³¹ Thus, nowadays, the Japanese government is moving toward an interpretation that Japan as a sovereign state has the right of collective self-defense under international law. Referring to the buildup of a missile defense system in Japan, *Kyodo News* reported on May 21, 2007, that Yanai Shuji, the chairman of a government panel on the right to collective self-defense, said “We would not be able to utilize the much-awaited missile defense if the conventional constitutional interpretation is maintained.”³² The news report continues, “Under the ban on fighting for an ally in collective self-defense, Japan would be unable to use its missile defense system if North Korean missiles, for example, are clearly aimed at the United States. ... As a result, it would have to allow such missiles to pass over its airspace [instead of blocking them], proponents of lifting the ban argue.”³³ Such increased regional instability, which Samuels mentions as the second factor, awakened the Japanese public to issues associated with national security. Interestingly, according to a government survey, over eighty percent of the Japanese respondents are worried about a potential military attack against Japan, reflecting their concern over North Korea’s nuclear programs and China’s military buildup.³⁴ Samuels writes, “Wishful thinking about peace was being replaced by

realistic discussion of war. What little support still existed for the idea that Japan should be a conscientious objector in world councils declined further.³⁵ The third factor is the waning power of the socialist parties, which for decades had promised to protect the pacifist Constitution. As mentioned earlier, former JSP Premier Murayama accepted the constitutionality of the SDF and the legitimacy of the US-Japan Security Treaty, thus disappointing JSP supporters. Following this political sentiment, the Defense Agency was upgraded to a ministry in early 2007.

With regard to the revision process of the Constitution, technically speaking, the current Japanese Constitution states that any amendment is to be initiated by parliament through a concurring vote of two-thirds from both houses and then be presented to the people for endorsement by a majority vote in a referendum. No legislation had been established that set rules for such a referendum for the past sixty years. However, in May 2007, under Prime Minister Abe, Japan's parliament passed a bill to set referendum procedures for constitutional revision, establishing its first legal framework to rewrite the Constitution since it went into effect sixty years ago.³⁶ Under the new law, furthermore, constitutional screening committees were set up (but have not actually worked yet as of February 2011) in both the upper and lower houses. Although the law did not come into force until 2010, this action initiated a boost in national debates to revise the Constitution in a move to depart from what Abe called Japan's "postwar regime." Following this development, it is reported that Nakayama, a former chair of the Research Commission on the Constitution in the House of Representatives, told a meeting of the party's constitution council, "It is necessary for us to launch a national referendum association for constitutional revision aimed at enlightening voters and supporters to become builders of a new country."³⁷ He suggested forming a new organization to promote a campaign for revising the Constitution. In fact, a group supporting the constitutional revision had been set up in March 2007, headed by former Prime Minister Nakasone. The group was organized by Diet members from the LDP, the DPJ, New Komeito, and the People's New Party. It had its first meeting since its establishment in Tokyo on May 1, 2008, at which the members strongly demanded that the official discussion toward the revision start at the national Diet as soon as possible.³⁸ As a result of these developments, scholars such as Inoguchi Takashi have been predicting that constitutional change may be imminent.³⁹

Discussions calling for the revision were shelved after the LDP lost its majority in the July 2007 upper house election, in which Abe advocated the constitutional revision as one of Japan's most imminent political agendas. Since then, the LDP has not secured the two-thirds majority in the upper house, a requirement for a constitutional amendment. Following the election, Abe's successors, Fukuda Yasuo and Aso Taro, both adopted a wait-and-watch stance on this issue. In August 2009, Japan's DPJ came into power after the party won the general election by a landslide, taking the majority in the lower house. The DPJ, which includes some revisionists, such as Ozawa, pledged to generate active nationwide discussions on the Constitution. People at the grassroots level have adopted a cautious approach, expressing their strong opposition to the revision, particularly that of Article 9.

ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES FROM GRASSROOTS PEACE MOVEMENTS

While Japan is now taking concrete steps toward remilitarization, one can observe the ongoing development of social movements across the country as one of the major attempts against the constitutional revision. The grassroots peace movements represent different identities, explore different concepts of peace than those presented by the politicians at the state level, and create a collective identity in favor of the Constitution through the social movement. One of them is organized by the Article 9 Association, a nationwide network-based civic group established in June 2004 in Tokyo to campaign against the LDP's plan to revise the pacifist clause of the Constitution. The association seeks to popularize the idea of peace and nonviolence through mobilizing grassroots movements. Here is an excerpt from an "appeal" announcement when it was established:

In order to join hands with all peace-seeking citizens around the globe, we feel that we must put our efforts into bringing attention to Article 9 in this turbulent world. To that end, each and every citizen, as sovereign members of this country, needs to personally adopt the Japanese Constitution, with its Article 9, and reaffirm their belief in it through their daily actions. This is a responsibility that the sovereign members share for the future state of their country. Thus, in the interest of a peaceful future for Japan and

the world, we would like to appeal to each and every citizen to come together to protect the Japanese Constitution: You must begin making every possible effort to thwart these “constitutional revision” movements and you must begin today.⁴⁰

This civic group was originally founded by nine writers and activists: Inoue Hisashi (writer, died in 2010), Kato Shuichi (critic, died in 2008), Miki Mutsuko (president of the Asia-Pacific Ladies Friendship Society and wife of the late Miki Takeo, former prime minister), Ōe Kenzaburo (Nobel Prize winner, writer), Oda Makoto (writer, died in 2007), Okudaira Yasuhiro (constitutional scholar), Sawachi Hisae (writer), Tsurumi Shunsuke (philosopher), and Umehara Takeshi (philosopher). Some of the founding members were also leading figures in prior peace movements in Japan, such as *Beheiren* in the 1960s. In fact, this new movement employs the same strategies that were characteristic of the peace movements that Japan witnessed a couple of decades ago. The strategies—local groups federated into a national one as well as testimonies of personal experiences—are, in fact, ongoing. According to a newsletter of the association, the latest available data at the time of writing, 7507 branches were officially registered across the country.⁴¹ One of the major differences is that this social movement demonstrates a case of local actors constituting new members of global politics; such globalization can be achieved by taking advantage of the Internet or other forms of information technology. The website of the association (<http://www.9-jo.jp>) is available in five languages—Japanese, Chinese, Korean, English, and French. The people of South Korea established a branch of the association to support the pro-Japanese Constitution campaign; they aim to create a pacifist constitution in the Korean Peninsula.⁴² Furthermore, an earlier newsletter states that ten people inaugurated a group in Vancouver, Canada, in May 2005.⁴³

Their activities are largely being conducted at the community level in Japan. In addition, there are numerous workplace/occupation-based groups. For example, one group is exclusively organized by female teachers working at Tokyo metropolitan high schools. Others have been organized by the handicapped, by lawyers, by medical doctors and nurses; scientists; *haiku* poets; filmmakers; architects; farmers and fishermen; and graduate students in the Tokyo metropolitan area. According to its newsletter, the secretariat of the association received 475 activity reports from local and occupational groups across the

country in September 2007.⁴⁴ One group located in Tamagawa Gakuen, a suburban residential area in western Tokyo, reported that since its establishment in November 2004, it had sponsored 33 monthly meetings and carried out a signature collection campaign at the local train station. In Sanjo, an industrial city in Niigata Prefecture, one group sponsored a public screening of the film *Nihon no aozora* (Blue Sky in Japan), a movie detailing the process of framing the current Japanese Constitution shortly after World War II. The movie emphasizes how the current Constitution was made through the efforts of Japanese people themselves; the message is the Constitution was not produced just by Americans. The group also placed an opinion advertisement stating, "We are against the constitutional revision" with the names of 1108 people in the local newspaper on May 3, Constitution Day. Meanwhile, another newsletter reported on activities developed by a group in Minobu, a local mountain town with a population of 15,000, in Yamanashi Prefecture.⁴⁵ The group had a gathering for listening to wartime experiences. Fifty people attended this gathering. One of them, a 95-year old man, declared, "Today, I came here only to talk about the vanity of war itself." He was drafted into the army two years before the war ended. After Japan's defeat, he faced many hardships as a captive for three years.

The local group I have been observing (and participating in, but not as a regular member) is a part of this social movement entity. Located in an eastern Tokyo municipality, the group was established in October 2006, two and a half years after the Article 9 Association was organized. According to a handout from 2007 that promotes its activities, the community-based group has 144 regular members (81 men and 63 women) as well as 263 supporting members. Mr. Tanaka, a leader of the local group, writes the following in the introductory leaflet:

We agree and support the "appeal" advocated by the Article 9 Association. We ask all of the residents in our community to read and support the appeal. We are now facing a situation wherein this country will become one that can fight war if Article 9 is changed. The other option is that based on the lessons we learned in the twentieth century, we could continue to be a country that never participates in war. ... By protecting and fostering Article 9, we can live in peace. For example, peace lies in performing daily activities without undue concern: we go shopping at the local shopping

arcade, send children to school, and go to work. Our group pursues only one thing: protecting Article 9, which renounces war beyond any kind of political and religious creeds. As something we can do as an individual now, we are going to ask you to read the appeal and become members of this local group.

Another handout, a tri-folded, green piece of paper, includes a part of the Preface (cited at the beginning of this paper) and entire statements from Article 9 as well as Article 99, which articulates that all public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution. The passage follows:

Prime Minister Abe declared that he would revise the Constitution during his tenure. However, we still don't understand why the Constitution needs to be revised now. The Constitution plays a significant role in supervising the activities of the government in order to avoid the mistakes we made during World War II. Thus, we have Article 99, which requires public officials, not ordinary people, to respect the Constitution. The Constitution itself controls the government's activities. ... Have you seriously thought about the meaning of changing the Constitution?

The local group was led by two people: Mr. Tanaka, who is a union staff member, and Mr. Kato, a retired junior high school history teacher. The group regularly organized a series of monthly talks on war experiences as well as a study group meeting where they read the articles of the Constitution in sequence, discussed them, and sponsored public film screenings. Among their activities, for example, talks were conducted under the title *Sensō no shinjitsu wo shiru: taikendan wo taikendan de owaraserutameni* (Knowing the truth of the war: trying not to repeat the past experiences). The recollection of a survivor of the massive Tokyo air raid in March 1945 encouraged local residents to recall their wartime experiences. His talk was intended to provide the youth with an opportunity to hear about these experiences. The group produced a monthly newsletter primarily to record their activities. The June 2007 issue reports that they held an active discussion on *Nippon kaigi* (Japan Conference). *Nippon kaigi* is a conservative think tank that has branch offices in each of the 47 prefectures all over Japan, specializing in issues such as the Constitution, education, diplomacy, and defense. It aims to propose practical, relevant policies to

the Japanese government as well as the ruling LDP. Meanwhile, the group is also known for playing a significant role in promoting nationalistic and patriotic sentiment in the current conservative political discourse. In the discussion on that day, one of the participants presented a list of local politicians belonging to the Japan Conference. The list included ten members of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly from the municipality and six members of the municipal assembly; most of the participants did not know this fact. He pointed out how their local politics had actually been influenced by the philosophy of the Japan Conference, without consciously realizing it.

NARRATIVES OF *HIBAKUSHA*

Given below is a narrative account of a testimony sponsored by the local group. It generated major interest because the testimony was going to be produced by a survivor of the atomic bomb (*hibakusha*) in Hiroshima and she planned to narrate her experiences. In particular, this interest was augmented because she related her experiences to the current political discourse on the constitutional revision. In fact, her testimony represents a part of a dynamic construction of personal identity through her persistent efforts to achieve peace. The construction of identity emerges from the dialectical nature of social movements and politics,⁴⁶ and the life history narrated by participants of social movements will be reproduced until the contradictions in real politics are resolved. The accumulation of such life histories will be a great source for generating a shared collective identity when they challenge the dominant political discourse.

Mrs. Takahashi experienced the atomic bomb when she was 17. She currently lives in the community, although she was originally from a town near Osaka. She is 79 and is retired from her professional career as a science teacher in a junior high school. She began her narratives, delving into her memory. Even though the bombing took place more than sixty years ago, through her narratives one could vividly picture what she had experienced. Her testimony is quoted at length here to illustrate how her war experience has played a significant role in constructing her identity, pursuing peace throughout her life:

On August 6, 1945, I was a freshman student at a female teachers' college in Hiroshima. I had finished high school in March of that year, and took the entrance examination of the college,

which had just been established as the third national female teachers' college in Japan. As the war progressed, however, the newly established school postponed its acceptance of students, which was originally planned for April. The opening ceremony was finally held on July 22, a delay of three months or more. In fact, my relatives sometimes ironically said that I went to Hiroshima just to experience the atomic bomb. The bombing took place just two weeks after classes started. I was very excited with my new school life. Approximately one hundred students had enrolled from in and outside Japan. Some came from the Korean peninsula. The school had three majors—science, home economics, and physical education. I majored in science since I was impressed with the achievements of Einstein, and that was my main motivation for studying science.

I still remember the moment vividly. It was Monday morning. The sun was shining and it was a beautiful, clear day. Every Monday before the first class, the school had a morning gathering in the schoolyard. After the gathering, I went back to the classroom and waited for the principal with my classmates. I remember the first class was moral science, which was taught by the school principal. Around ten past eight, I was seated. Suddenly I saw a beam entering my classroom. It was something like burning magnesium. The next moment, the school building had collapsed. I was on the second floor. I remember things only until that point. After that, I fainted. When I regained consciousness, I didn't know how much time had passed. I heard somebody groan. I smelled something burning. I tried, in desperation, to crawl out from the collapsed wood and succeeded. Several people also crawled out from under the collapsed building materials.

I realized that my left foot hurt. I could not open my right eye due to (possibly) a blow. In a sense, however, I was pretty lucky since my seat in the classroom was near the wall. My classmates near the window actually suffered from awful burns. I had never seen such a spectacle—the burns on their skin (which turned into keloids) and clothes were stuck together, twisted, and hanging down. I was with Ms. Egawa, one of my classmates, on the site, and we encouraged each other, saying that if we could survive, we would definitely see each other again.

My school was located 1.8 kilometers north of ground zero. Everything had collapsed. I could see from our college to the

center of Hiroshima. Many houses, shops, and human beings had disappeared instantly from the earth.

Anyway, I stood up, and started walking barefooted. It was very dark, and the city was covered by the so-called mushroom cloud. However, I continued to walk, dragging my left foot. In retrospect, another lucky thing was that I happened to start walking in the opposite direction of ground zero. At that time, we had no idea what had happened. We did not even know that this inhumane bomb was a new weapon called the atomic bomb.

It took Mrs. Takahashi twenty days to get to her parents' home. It was late August. She spent the next three months in hospital.

She continued talking, introducing her life after the war. Since the early 1970s, after moving to this community in downtown Tokyo, she had been involved with activities organized by *hibakusha*. In 1981, the local residents built a stone monument (two-by-two meters of green natural stone) in a municipal park to mourn the victims of the atomic bomb. It was a sculpture titled *Hato to boshizō* (a dove embracing mother and child). It represented mothers and children who were killed by the atomic bomb as a dove flying all over the world in an appeal for peace. More than two hundred of the local residents participated in creating the monument. They actually carved the stone with a chisel and a hammer. The names of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki victims from the local community were listed underneath the monument. Moreover, the fountain around the monument is programmed to spray water on the structure twice a day at the exact time of the two atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is prayed that the suffering of the victims who died begging for water be relieved of their pain. She also added that the stone monument was growing every year. Since the establishment, atom-bombed tiles were presented from Hiroshima. They planted a camphor tree from Hiroshima and a Chinese wax tree from Nagasaki—the respective official municipal trees—next to the monument.

Mrs. Takahashi continued with her talk, citing a recent news report that low-level leaks of radioactive material was detected from a nuclear power plant that was damaged by a strong earthquake in Niigata Prefecture in mid July 2007:

For hibakusha like me, we will never forget what we saw under the mushroom cloud. It was a hellish spectacle. The scene was

strongly imprinted on my memory. During my lifetime, I have continuously been threatened by the effects of radioactivity, which I had been exposed to when I was 17. I did not realize the effects of radioactivity at that time. Radioactivity has, as you know, no taste and no smell. I suffered from many blood-related diseases. Above all, I have been continuously threatened by the effects of radioactivity on my offspring.

Today, several major countries own thousands of nuclear weapons. If all of them are used, we human beings will surely become extinct. I also believe that this planet will surely be ruined. What we can do now is join hands beyond national borders in order to pursue peace. In order to achieve a peaceful society, our Constitution is our treasure. Our Constitution gives us the maximum power and the strongest means to achieve it.

Even though Japan is the only country to have experienced the atomic bomb, nobody can guarantee that Japan will never get involved in war. There even exists the possibility that Japan will hold nuclear weapons in the future. However, if such things actually happen, our hibakusha's suffering would be doubled.

Mrs. Takahashi continues to confirm “being at peace” in her lifetime. For her, peace is not a static concept nor is it something given by somebody. It is her individual identity. It is generated by her and through her reflections and practices. She reflects and practices peace through her daily life by passing her stories on war experiences down to the next generation and participating in building the stone monument in the municipal park. By combining such individual efforts by ordinary grassroots individuals, peace is generated, confirmed, and maintained. Mrs. Takahashi’s narratives, based on her true-life experiences, powerfully counter the dominant political discourse on the revision of the Constitution. In fact, her narratives present a grassroots concept of peace that “shapes the content of the norm ‘trapped’ inside the text”⁴⁷ of Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution. Such narratives are now being generated by various local groups across the country as people try to confirm the meaning of peace.

CONCLUSION

In the late 2000s, the social movement led by the Article 9 Association expanded nationwide. Almost every day in 2006 and 2007,

when I was doing intensive fieldwork on this issue, newspapers reported various kinds of activities at the grassroots level against the revision of the Constitution. In July 2007, *Tokyo Shinbun* reported about a café in Kōenji, Tokyo, where students, businessmen, and part-time workers actively discussed the Constitution over coffee and soft drinks, listening to jazz.⁴⁸ On that day, the café invited a university professor who stated, “There is a high possibility that the revision of the Constitution will start in 2010, and now we need to imagine what will happen if a war breaks out.” One young man commented, “Many show little interest in the Constitution. I wish such places for discussions would expand across the country.”⁴⁹ A local newspaper in Okinawa, *Ryukyu Shimpō*, wrote a story in September 2007 about a local youth group, in Naha, wearing T-shirts printed with “9” as part of their pro-Constitution appeal.⁵⁰ It is clear that the number 9 symbolized Article 9 and the youth expected local people to reconsider the significance of this article. In October 2007, *Kobe Shinbun* reported that people supporting Article 9 were producing teacups.⁵¹ Drinking tea is a cultural symbol in Japanese life. It is something taken for granted in daily life. When these teacups are filled with hot water, the Article 9 sentence appears. It represents Article 9 being as ingrained in each Japanese person as the act of drinking tea is.

However, there are serious concerns over this emerging movement. As Mr. Tanaka of Article 9 Association personally expressed to me, participants in the groups are still very limited. Most of them were in their 60s and 70s—the generation that actually experienced World War II. I confirmed this during additional interviews with the members in December 2010. If they cannot seek a broader and more dynamic participation, the movement will not expand. I also confirmed this when I attended the first national gathering in July 2005 in Ariake, Tokyo. There were approximately 9500 people in attendance, according to the association.⁵² However, I observed that the majority were elderly people. I also observed that party leaders from the Social Democratic Party and the JCP were invited to the national meeting. The 1960s movement was indeed very strong, supported by those parties at that time. However, left-wing politicians could not produce any effective security policy alternatives over the post-World War II period. Even now when the LDP and conservative politicians generate specific proposals for revising the Japanese Constitution, they have a

difficult time putting anything concrete and realistic in front of the constituents.

The arguments examined in this article demonstrate conflicts and disagreements between politicians and grassroots individuals in the political discourse regarding the revision of the Japanese Constitution. According to the latest poll conducted in March 2010 by *Yomiuri Shinbun*, forty-three percent of the respondents supported the revision of the Constitution and forty-two percent disagreed.⁵³ Since 1993, the newspaper company had conducted the survey on the Constitution. The number of people who supported revision had always surpassed the number of those who did not. In the 2008 poll, however, the trend was reversed by a slight margin.⁵⁴ It was being considered a success generated by the ongoing countrywide anti-revision movements led by the Article 9 Association. Meanwhile, the latest poll showed again a slight reverse on the discourse.

The topic of constitutional revision today has a polarizing effect among the Japanese people. People are noted as being either for or against it. However, the Japanese state faces dramatic changes in international political life, and the Japanese people have to respond to the situation realistically. One of the major arguments is Japan's expanding role in international peacekeeping operations, such as the counterterrorism military operation in Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean. To participate in such missions in a more active and responsible manner, the political discourse tends to support the revision, making a new state identity in the international community. Meanwhile, in my fieldwork on the anti-Constitution revision movement, I have not heard any active discussions on Japan's role in international peacekeeping operations or grassroots narratives that link their war experiences and memories to Japan's role in new world politics. In fact, their narratives are, in some sense, concerned only with the individuals and just reiterate their war experiences. Indeed, the attitude towards defense and national security of the ordinary Japanese people is primarily driven by "dual victimization"—a term coined by Thomas Berger.⁵⁵ He argues that the dominant perception of the antimilitarist sentiment in Japan, compared to that in Germany, is the result of dual victimization. On the one hand, the Japanese felt that they had been victimized by the blind ambition of Japan's wartime military leadership. On the other hand, they also felt victimized by the United States and other foreign powers that, in the Japanese view, had conducted a ruthless campaign of conquest to strengthen their own power. Their

collective war experiences have generated an enduring antimilitarist sentiment, and the storytelling has played a significant role in linking generations. Meanwhile, however, I suggest that for most young Japanese people in their adolescence and 20s, war reminds them of the Gulf War in the early 1990s and the current US-led Iraqi war, instead of World War II. Focus needs to turn to what alternative political strategies the participants in the anti-revision movement try to create. In what way do they negotiate the political reality in the era of globalization with their own war experiences and memories? How would they locate Japan in the current international political environment? We have not yet been able to determine clearly their perspectives.

Probably, a straightforward answer cannot be obtained with regard to the constitutional revision. The answer lies with the Japanese people, both revisionists and anti-revisionists; they need to jointly develop a clear vision on how to transform the ideology of Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution into a practical and feasible contribution to international efforts toward peace. The first step is that the Japanese people would make serious efforts to locate themselves as members of the global community and to consider what they can do for peace. The process would require them to go beyond or overcome the struggles embedded in their cultural norm defined by war experiences and memories and generate a new image of international political life. It is indeed a process of redefining Japan's idea of pacifism and of exploring the new kinds of collective identities that the Japanese people continue to construct as a reflection of their arguments on peace.

NOTES

I appreciate Paul Midford, Robert Pekkanen, and two anonymous reviewers of *Peace & Change*, and editor Robbie Lieberman for their insightful suggestions for revisions. Because of the confidential nature of materials the paper draws upon, except for the names of nine Article 9 Association founders, no identifying information, including personal names, is provided. Except where otherwise indicated, all quotations are taken from my field notes and all translations are mine. Japanese individuals' names are written with the surname first, except when quoted from English language publications.

1. The official English translation of the Japanese Constitution is available at the Japanese National Diet Library website. <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html>. Accessed May 2, 2008.

2. See, for example, Yamamoto Shinichi, *Kenpō 9-jō no shisō suimyaku* (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 2001); and Yoichi Higuchi, ed. *Five Decades of Constitutionalism in Japanese Society* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2001).

3. Yoichi Higuchi, “The 1946 Constitution: Its Meaning in the Worldwide Development of Constitutionalism,” in *Five Decades of Constitutionalism in Japanese Society*, ed. Yoichi Higuchi (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2001), 7–8.

4. *Ibid.*, 8.

5. Akihiko Kimijima, “Revisiting the Pacifism of the Japanese Constitution,” in *Ritsumeikan kokusai kenkyū*, 18, No. 1 (2006): 191–206.

6. See Takamichi Mito, “Japan’s Constitutional Revision Debate under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and its Implications for Japan’s Foreign Relations,” in *Japanese Studies*, 28, No. 1 (2008): 59–71. He argues Abe’s politics toward the constitutional revision and its implications for Japan’s foreign relations.

7. I develop my argument in line with such works as David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Bradley S. Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

8. My argument shares a perspective presented by Steve Breyman’s “Were the 1980s’ Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements New Social Movements?” in *Peace & Change* 22, No. 3 (July 1997): 303–329, which points out many similarities between the behavior of new and old social movements.

9. For an analysis on social movements in the early postwar era, see Volker Fuhr, “Peace Movements as Emancipatory Experience—Anpo tōsō and Beheiren in 1960s’ Japan,” in *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War*, ed. Benjamin Ziemann (Essen: Klartext-Verlag, 2008), 77–90.

10. The treaty has two features: one is the defense of Japan stipulated in Article 5: each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes; the other is the use of Japanese territory and facilities by the U.S. forces for regional security stipulated in Article 6: for the purpose of contributing to the

security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. Available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>. Accessed on August 30, 2009.

11. John Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems: External Policy and Internal Conflict," in *Postwar Japan as History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 22.

12. See Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, *Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001) on the development of citizen-based movements in the 1960s.

13. Fuhr, "Peace Movements as Emancipatory Experience," 82–89.

14. See Toshihiro Higuchi, "An Environmental Origin of Antinuclear Activism in Japan, 1954–1963: The Government, the Grassroots Movement, and the Politics of Risk," in *Peace & Change*, 33:3 (July 2008): 333–367, which points out environmental and consumerist origins in the development of antinuclear movements in the early postwar era.

15. For a detailed analysis of Japanese politics in the post-Cold War era, see Thomas U. Berger, "The Politics of Memory: Japanese Foreign Relations," in *Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State*, eds. Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 194–202.

16. However, on April 17, 2008, the Nagoya High Court ruled in a suit that the Air Self-Defense Force's airlifting of multinational combat troops into the war zone of Baghdad is unconstitutional because it is an act integral to other countries' use of force. Another similar judgment was issued by the Okayama District Court on February 24, 2009.

17. Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2007* (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2007), 110.

18. House of Representatives Research Commission on the Constitution, *Shūgin kenpō chōsakai hōkokusho* (Tokyo: House of Representatives, 2005).

19. House of Representatives Research Commission on the Constitution, *Kenpō chōsakai kaigiroku* (Tokyo: House of Representatives, January 20, 2000.)

20. Mayumi Itoh, "Japanese Constitutional Revision: A Neo-Liberal Proposal for Article 9 in Comparative Perspective," in *Asian Survey* 41, No. 2 (March/April 2001): 310–327, provides a comparative analysis of the proposals for revision prepared by the conservative camp in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

21. “LDP, at 50, goes after Constitution: Change would give SDF proper military status,” in *Japan Times* November 23, 2005.

22. Ibid.

23. “LDP names former premiers to lead drafting of new constitution,” in *Kyodo News* January 24, 2005.

24. All of these revision proposals are available in English and have been examined in their entirety by Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis* (London; New York: Routledge, 2001).

25. Nakasone Yasuhiro, “36 nen buri ni kōhyō sareta nakasone yasuihiro ‘kenpō shian’ zenbun,” *Seiron*, 299 (July 1997), 138–59. Nakasone proposed that the Constitution be amended from its preamble to its most important elements, and that a new preamble begin by declaring that the Japanese people have developed a unique culture and lifestyle revering the emperor as the symbol of the unity of the people.

26. Ozawa Ichiro, *Nihon kaizō keikaku* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993).

27. Japan Business Federation, “Wagakuni no kihon mondai wo kangaeru,” announced on January 18, 2005, available at <http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2005/002/honbun.html>. Accessed on December 12, 2007.

28. Junior Chamber International Japan, “2006 nendoban nihon koku kenpō JC sōan saishūban,” available at <http://www06.jaycee.or.jp/2006/modules/tinyd14/index.php?id=10>. Accessed on December 12, 2007.

29. Richard J. Samuels, “Securing Japan: The Current Discourse,” in *Journal of Japanese Studies* 33 No. 1 (Winter 2007): 125–52.

30. Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2007* (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense), 111.

31. Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2009* (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2009), 120.

32. “Panel chief seeks reinterpreting Constitution to defend ally in war,” *Kyodo News*, May 21, 2007.

33. Ibid.

34. Cabinet Office, “Kokumin hogo ni kansuru tokubetsu yoron chōsa’ no gaiyō” (Tokyo: Cabinet Office, 2007).

35. Samuels, “Securing Japan,” 136.

36. Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution states the following: “Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special

referendum or at such an election as the Diet shall specify. Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people as an integral part of this Constitution.” Abe claims in his mail magazine, “However, the specific procedure for conducting such a referendum had been left undecided for the past 60 years. With the adoption of such a procedure for the first time, it has now become possible for the people to take the revision of the Constitution into their own hands.” This quotation is from the Abe Cabinet E-mail Magazine No. 29 (17 May 2007), entitled “Passage of the National Referendum Bill.” <http://www.mmz.kantei.go.jp/foreign/m-magazine/backnumber/2007/0517.html>. Accessed 15, December 2007.

37. “Kaikenban ‘9-jō no kai’ secchi wo,” *Jiji Press*, June 15, 2007. See also Nakayama Taro, *Kenpō senya ichiya* (Tokyo: Chuō kōron shinsha, 2005).

38. “Kenpō shinsakai, sōki shidō motomeru ketsugi saitaku,” *Maimichi Shinbun*, May 1, 2008. The group is called *Shin kenpō seitei giin dōmei* in Japanese.

39. See Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase,” in *Japanese Studies* 28 No. 1 (2008): 3–13.

40. Article 9 Association, “9-jo no kai ‘apīru,’” announced on June 10, 2004, <http://www.9-jo.jp/appeal.html>, accessed on October 9, 2007.

41. Article 9 Association, in *News*, No. 136 (May 14, 2010).

42. “Kankoku de ‘9-jō no kai’ hossoku, gakusha ya shimin ra 100 nin,” in *Kyodo News*, November 17, 2007.

43. Article 9 Association, in *News*, No. 93 (August 31, 2007).

44. Article 9 Association, in *News*, No. 95 (September 19, 2007).

45. Article 9 Association, in *News*, No. 90 (July 13, 2007).

46. See Breyman, “Were the 1980s’ Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements New Social Movements?” 313.

47. Aharon Barak, *Purposive Interpretation in Law* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 3.

48. “Kafe de, yose de, heiwa kataru 9-jō shiji kusanone Jiwari,” in *Tokyo Shinbun*, July 10, 2007.

49. *Ibid.*

50. “Kenpō 9-jō wo mijikani,” in *Ryukyu Shinpō*, September 24, 2007.

51. “9-jō kappu ikaga? oyu wo sosoguto jōbun fuwari,” in *Kobe Shinbun*, October 18, 2007.

52. Article 9 Association, in *News*, No. 48 (August 1, 2005).

53. Kenpōkaisei ‘sansei’ genshō 43%, ‘hantai’ to kikkō,” in *Yomiuri Shinbun*, April 9, 2010.

54. Kenpōkaisei ‘hantai’ 43%, ‘sansei’ wo uwamawaru—yomiuri yoron chōsa,” *Yomiuri Shinbun*, April 8, 2008. In the poll, 42.5 percent of the respondents supported the revision of the Constitution and 43.1 percent disagreed.

55. Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, MD; London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 7.